We evaluate the asset pricing implications of a class of models in which risk sharing is imperfect because of the limited enforcement of intertemporal contracts. Lustig (2004) has shown that in such a model the asset pricing kernel can be written as a simple function of the aggregate consumption growth rate and the growth rate of consumption of the set of households that do not face binding enforcement constraints in that state of the world. These unconstrained households have lower consumption growth rates than constrained households, i.e. they are located in the lower tail of the crosssectional consumption growth distribution. We use household consumption data from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey to estimate the pricing kernel implied by the model and to evaluate its performance in pricing aggregate risk. We employ the same data to construct aggregate consumption and to derive the standard complete markets pricing kernel. We …nd that the limited enforcement pricing kernel generates a market price of risk that is substantially larger than the standard complete markets asset pricing kernel.
Introduction
Consumption-based asset pricing kernels derived under the complete risk sharing, representative agent (RE) assumption cannot explain the large equity premium, at least not with plausible preference speci…cations (see e.g. Mehra and Prescott, 1985) . Models in which the sharing of idiosyncratic risk is limited have the potential to solve the puzzle (see for example Constantinides and Du¢e, 1996) . In these models, the asset pricing kernel, in general, does not only depend on aggregate consumption but it also depends on the entire distribution of consumption across agents. Di¤erent models provide di¤erent links between the distribution of consumption and asset pricing kernels. An important task is to evaluate whether these models are useful in solving the equity premium puzzle. Recently some studies have done work along this line, either evaluating several types of incomplete risk sharing models (See for example Brav, Constantinides and Geczy, 2002, Vissing-Jorgensen, 2002 and Kocherlakota and Pistaferri, 2006) or exploring the empirical link between asset prices and higher moments of the consumption growth distribution (Cogley, 2002) .
This paper contributes to this research agenda. It evaluates the asset pricing implications of a class of models in which risk sharing is imperfect because of the limited enforcement (henceforth LE) of intertemporal contracts, as in Thomas and Worrall (1988) or Kehoe and Levine (1993) . No restrictions are imposed on the menu of traded assets. Alvarez and Jermann (2001) have explored the asset pricing implications of LE in a two agent economy, but they have not evaluated its empirical implications for the cross-sectional distribution of consumption and asset prices. Lustig (2004) has shown that in a version of this model with a continuum of agents the asset pricing kernel can be written as a simple function of the growth rate of consumption of the set of households that do not face binding enforcement constraints in the current state of the world. These unconstrained households have lower consumption growth rates than those households that face binding enforcement constraints. This implication of the model allows us to identify unconstrained households as those in the lower tail of the cross-sectional consumption growth distribution.
We construct the LE pricing kernel using data on household consumption expenditures from the U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey (CE) and evaluate its performance in pricing aggregate risk. To be consistent, we use the same CE data to construct aggregate consumption and to compute the standard RE pricing kernel. As documented in previous studies, the RE pricing kernel only explains a small part of the equity premium. The power of the LE pricing kernel depends crucially on how we identify unconstrained households but, in general, it explains a larger fraction of the equity premium than the RE pricing kernel.
The Model
We consider a pure exchange economy with a continuum of agents that face aggregate and idiosyncratic endowment shocks, trade state-contingent claims to consumption on competitive markets and face solvency constraints that limit the extent to which agents can go short in these consumption claims. In this section we …rst describe the underlying physical environment and the market structure, then we de…ne a competitive equilibrium and …nally we provide a characterization of the asset pricing kernel implied by this model.
Physical Environment
We denote the current aggregate shock by z t 2 Z and the current idiosyncratic shock by y t 2 Y ; with Z and Y …nite. Let z t = (z 0 ; : : : ; z t ) and y t = (y 0 ; : : : ; y t ) denote the history of aggregate and idiosyncratic shocks. We use the notation s t = (y t ; z t ) and s t = (y t ; z t ) and let the economy start at initial node z 0 : Conditional on idiosyncratic shock y 0 and thus s 0 = (y 0 ; z 0 ); the probability of a history s t is given by ¼ t (s t js 0 ): Individual endowments are given by e t (s t ):
At time 0 households are indexed by their idiosyncratic income shock y 0 and their initial asset position a 0 : We denote by £ 0 (y 0 ; a 0 ) the initial distribution of agents over (y 0 ; a 0 ); this initial distribution, together with the initial aggregate shock z 0 serves as initial condition for our economy.
Consumers rank stochastic consumption streams © c t (a 0 ; s
where°> 0 is the coe¢cient of relative risk aversion and¯2 (0; 1) is the constant time discount factor.
Market Structure
Households can trade a complete set of contingent consumption claims © a t (a 0 ; s t ; s t+1 ) ª at prices q t (s t ; s t+1 ). Thus their budget constraints read as
These trades are subject to solvency constraints © J(a 0 ; s t ; s t+1 ) ª such that
The solvency constraints, precisely spelled out below, are not too tight, in the sense of Alvarez and Jermann (2000): a household that has borrowed exactly up to the constraint (that is ¡a t (a 0 ; s t ; s t+1 ) = J (a 0 ; ; s t ; s t+1 )) is indi¤erent between defaulting on her debt (and su¤ering the corresponding consequences spelled out below) and repaying (and thus avoiding these consequences). In the standard complete markets model J (a 0 ; s t ; s t+1 ) = 1; since in that model households can fully commit to repay any debt they take on.
Denote by V (a; s t ) the maximized continuation expected lifetime utility an agent can attain, if she comes into the current period with assets a t¡1 (a 0 ; s t ) = a and faces constraints (2) and (3): Furthermore let V Aut (s t ) denote the expected lifetime utility of an agent from consuming the autarkic allocation c t (a 0 ; s t ) = e t (s t ) from node s t on. 1 Finally let c a t denote aggregateconsumption (equal to the aggregate endowment). The market clearing condition reads as
The solvency constraints are not too tight, that is, satisfy, for all (y 0 ; a 0 ) and all s t+1 ; V (J(a 0 ; s t ; s t+1 );
3. Market clearing: Equation (4) holds
Characterization of Equilibria
Let (y 0 ; a 0 ) denote the characteristics of a generic household. In order to characterize equilibrium consumption allocations and the pricing kernel we make use of cumulative Lagrange multipliers f» t (y 0 ; a 0 )g, in the spirit of Marcet and Marimon (1998) . In period 0 there is a one to one map between Lagrange multipliers » 0 and initial wealth a 0 : Thus let the initial distribution of Lagrange multipliers associated with the distribution of initial wealth £ 0 (y 0 ; a 0 ) be denoted by © 0 (y 0 ; » 0 ). Henceforth we will use the notation » t (y 0 ; a 0 ) and » t (y 0 ; » 0 ) interchangeably. Over time these Lagrange multipliers increase whenever the solvency constraint of a household binds, and remains unchanged otherwise. Crucially, this implies that for all agents that are unconstrained in a current state, their Lagrange multipliers all remain unchanged. As shown by Lustig (2004) the consumption process of a given household is related to aggregate consumption (endowment) by the risk sharing rule
where
and © t is the cross-sectional measure over consumption weights » t (» 0 ; s t ) in period t; state z t : To rule out arbitrage opportunities, payo¤s in state z t+1 are priced o¤ the intertemporal marginal rate of substitution (IMRS) of those agents who do not face any binding constraints in transferring resources to and from that state (see Alvarez and Jermann, (2000) ). Let UC(s t ; s t+1 ) denote the set of these agents. The stochastic discount factor is the IMRS of those agents with labels » ¤ 0 2 U C(s t ; s t+1 ); who are unconstrained in state s t in their sale of securities that deliver goods in state s t+1 :
he risk sharing rule in (5) and the fact that for all unconstrained agents the consumption weights do not change
) then immediately imply that the pricing kernel is given by:
: Note that in the standard complete markets model the solvency constraints are never binding, thus the distribution of consumption weights (Lagrange multipliers) is never changing, and consequently h t+1 (z t+1 ) = h t (z t ) and g(z t+1 ) = 1 for all z t+1 : Therefore, we recover the well-known stochastic discount factor of the RE model
The only e¤ect of LE on asset prices is the component contributed by the shocks to the cross-sectional distribution of consumption weights g(z t+1 ):
Implementation
In order to generate an empirical time series for the LE stochastic discount factor in (6) from cross-sectional consumption data we need to estimate the aggregate consumption growth rate and the growth rate of the consumption weight distribution:
But from the risk sharing rule in (5) we know that this moment of the consumption weight distribution satis…es:
For all unconstrained households the consumption weight does not change in state s t+1 ; » t+1 (» 0 ; s t+1 ) = » t (» 0 ; s t ); and hence their consumption growth rate satis…es:
All unconstrained households have the same growth rate of consumption
where g a (z t+1 ) is the growth rate of aggregate consumption and g UC (z t+1 ) is the common consumption growth rate of currently unconstrained households. Combining (8) and (6); we obtain the following simple representation of the stochastic discount factor:
Furthermore it is clear from (5) that currently constrained households have consumption growth rates strictly higher than g UC (z t+1 ) since for those households » t+1 (» 0 ; s t+1 ) > » t (» 0 ; s t ): Consequently unconstrained households can be empirically identi…ed as those households in the lower tail of the cross-sectional consumption growth distribution 3 Testing the Empirical Asset Pricing Implications of the Model
Data
The crucial di¤erence between the RE and the LE pricing kernel is that the former can be estimated using aggregate consumption data while for the latter data on household level consumption growth is needed. The U.S. Consumer Expenditure Survey provides such data since the majority of households sampled in this data set reports consumption expenditures for at least two subsequent quarters. We use quarterly data from 1980.1 to 2004.1. For each quarter t we select all households which are complete income respondents and which report positive expenditures on non durable goods and services for quarters t and t +1. For each household we then compute quarterly growth rates of real (each component is de ‡ated with speci…c CPI's), per-adult equivalent expenditures on nondurables. We have a total of 284675 consumption growth rate observations. 2 The return data comes from the CRSP (the Center for Research on Securities Prices). As stock returns we use the quarterly value-weighted return on the entire US market (NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ), de ‡ated by the in ‡ation rate computed from the Consumer Price Index by the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Bond returns are based on the average yield of a 3-month US T-bill, again de ‡ated by the CPI.
Empirical Construction of the Asset Pricing Kernels
The main ingredient of the asset pricing kernel of the LE economy is a time series for the growth rate of consumption expenditures of unconstrained households. The model suggests that in each period all unconstrained agents share the same consumption growth rate, and that this growth rate is lower than consumption growth for all constrained households. In the data there is signi…cant measurement error in consumption. Moreover consumption growth in the data is also likely to depend on idiosyncratic events (for example changes in personal health, or educational expenses) which are not explicitly considered in our model. For these reasons simply selecting the lowest observed consumption growth rate would not be a very robust nor sensible way of selecting the consumption growth of unconstrained households. Instead we select a level of consumption growth which exhibits bunching (i.e. a large fraction of agents have consumption growth close to that level) and which is in the left tail of the cross sectional consumption growth rate distribution. Figure 1 shows the distribution of growth rate of consumption expenditures in the …rst quarter of 2003 and suggests that empirically plausible levels of consumption growth for the unconstrained lie between the 30 th (denoted as P30 in the …gure) and the 50 th percentile (median) of the consumption growth distribution. In the following section we take the 40 th percentile of the consumption growth rate distribution as our benchmark estimate of the the consumption growth rate of the unconstrained b g UC t+1 ; but we also experiment with setting it equal to the 30 th or the 50 th percentile.
FIGURE 1 HERE
Once the growth rate of the unconstrained consumers in each quarter has been estimated, it is easy to construct a time series for the LE pricing kernel according to (9) ; for a given risk aversion°and time discount factor¯:
Below we also report results for the standard RE model computed with our data for which the relevant stochastic discount factor iŝ
Hereĝ a t+1 is simply the growth rate of aggregate consumption in our CE sample between quarters t and t + 1:
Results
In this section we evaluate the performance of our pricing kernel in explaining the equity premium for di¤erent values of the risk aversion parameter°and under di¤erent assumptions for the identi…cation of unconstrained agents. For each speci…cation (including the RE stochastic discount factor) we set the time discount factor¯so that the sample mean of the estimated stochastic discount factor E T (m) is equal to 1. With this normalization fraction of the equity premium that is being explained by the stochastic discount factorm; as
where R S t+1 and R B t+1 denote the gross real return on equity and a risk-free bond, and Corr denotes a correlation, and cv denotes a coe¢cient of variation. Thus to explain a large equity premium we need a stochastic discount factor (and thus a consumption growth rate) that is negatively (positively) correlated with the equity premium and very volatile. The main component of the stochastic discount factors under consideration is consumption growth. Therefore in …gure 2 we plot the realized excess return on equity R S ¡ R B and aggregate consumption growtĥ g a , together with the consumption growth rate of unconstrained households b g UC ; identi…ed as the the growth rate of the household at the 40 th percentile of the consumption growth distribution.
FIGURE 2 HERE
Note that both aggregate consumption growth (and thus the RE stochastic discount factor) and the consumption growth rate of the unconstrained agents are much less volatile than the equity premium. The key di¤erence between the two growth rates series lies in their correlation with the excess return on equity. This correlation is slightly negative (-0.02) forĝ a while it is slightly positive forĝ UC (0.06). This di¤erence in the correlation is at the heart of the di¤erence between the equity premium explained by the two models that we report in …gure 3. 4 The …gure plots the equity premium produced by the RE and LE models; the growth rate of the unconstrained agents in the LE model is estimated as the 30th, 40th and 50th percentile of the consumption growth distribution. We also plot the average equity premium in the data, 1:76%; on a quarterly basis. For moderate levels of risk aversion. the equity premia implied by the LE models, while larger than the one implied by the RE, still fall signi…cantly short of the 1.76 % target. For higher risk aversion some versions of the LE model do signi…cantly better than the RE model. This suggests that this LE model may provide us with a better understanding of how aggregate risk is priced.
FIGURE 3 HERE
4 As a robustness check we also measured aggregate consumption growth from NIPA data. In our sample aggregate consumption growth from NIPA is slightly more correlated with the equity premium (the correlation is 0.13) but its volatility is only about one third of the volatility of the growth rate computed from CE data. As a consequence, as it is well known, the RE pricing kernel explains only a small fraction of the observed equity premium.
Conclusion
The standard representative agent model can only account for a small fraction of the equity premium. In this paper we show that introducing limited enforcement of intertemporal contracts improves the empirical performance of the consumption-based asset pricing model. In a standard LE model with a continuum of households the stochastic discount factor is a function of consumption growth of households in the left tail of the cross-sectional consumption growth distribution. We …nd that the LE pricing kernel can account for a signi…cantly larger share of the empirically observed equity premium (but not for the entire premium). Future work is needed to assess how careful modelling of measurement error in individual consumption growth would a¤ect the empirical estimation and performance of the proposed asset pricing kernel, and to investigate whether it can shed further light on other well-documented asset pricing puzzles (such as the value premium puzzle). 
